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MECHANICS' LIENS: CREATION,
PERFECTION OR ENFORCEMENT IN THE
FACE OF A STAY
Robert H. Bowmar*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The trustee in bankruptcy is the representative of the estate'
and, as such, has the principal duty of assuming control over all of
the debtor's property and reducing it to money for distribution to the
general unsecured creditors.' In this capacity, the trustee will attempt to nullify various liens on the debtor's encumbered property
through the exercise of certain statutory "avoiding powers." '
A mechanic's lienor is a person who, by expending labor, rendering services, or furnishing materials, improves a parcel of real
property and, by complying with applicable state law,4 acquires a
lien on the property as so improved. 5 Under the definitions contained
in the Bankruptcy Code,' this type of lien is a "statutory lien,' 7 and
* Professor of Law, Albany Law School. Professor Bowmar is the author of MECHANICS'
LIENS IN NEW YORK (1992), SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN NEW YORK (1991), MORTGAGE
LIENS IN NEW YORK (1990) and LIEN PRIORITIES IN NEW YORK (1987), each published by

Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Company.

1. 11 U.S.C. § 323(a) (1988).
2. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 704, 1106 (1988).
3. See 1I U.S.C. §§ 544 (trustee as lien creditor), 545 (statutory liens), 547 (preferences), 548 (fraudulent transfers and obligations), 549 (postpetition transactions) (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992); cf. 11 U.S.C. § 546 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (limitations on avoiding
powers).
4. State statutes vary considerably with respect to the conditions necessary for lien creation, perfection, continuation, or enforcement. Some of the variations are highlighted infra

parts V-VII.
5. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 981 (6th ed. 1990). For the most part, this article deals
with "private" improvement liens, which encumber improved parcels of real property, as distinguished from "public" improvement liens, which encumber the public funds that have been
allocated by a public entity for the improvement. See, e.g., N.Y. LIEN LAW § 5 (McKinney
1993) (lien is upon "the moneys of the state or of [a public] corporation applicable to
the . . .improvement").
6. The Bankruptcy Code ("the Code") was enacted by Title I of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat.) 2549 (codified as amended at
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in general, if it is created and perfected 8 prior to the bankruptcy of
the owner of a parcel of real property 9 and still valid at the time of
such bankruptcy,1" it may not be avoided by the trustee.11
For example, if a claim secured by a mechanic's lien exceeds
the value of the real property and the claim is "allowed,"' 2 the trustee cannot use section 506(d) of the Code to avoid the lien to the
extent it exceeds the fair market value of the property. 3 The lien
survives bankruptcy in its full amount and cannot be "stripped

down" to a judicially determined value of the collateral.' 4 Nor can
the trustee, standing in the shoes of either a hypothetical judicial lien
creditor' 5 or a bona fide purchaser," avoid a mechanic's lien that
11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)), and contains the substantive bankruptcy
law applicable to all bankruptcy cases commenced on or after October 1, 1979. The Code has
been amended several times since its enactment, and the current version appears at Title 11 of
the United States Code (1988 and Supp. IV 1992). See BENJAMIN WEINTRAUB & ALAN N.
RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL at xxvi (3d ed. 1992).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 101(53) (Supp. IV 1992) defines "statutory lien" as a
lien arising solely by force of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions . . .
but does not include [a] security interest or judicial lien, whether or not such interest or lien is provided by or is dependent on a statute and whether or not such
interest or lien is made fully effective by statute.
Id. This is in contrast to a "judicial lien" or a "security interest," defined at 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(36), (51) (Supp. IV 1992), respectively. The term "lien" is defined at 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(37) (Supp. IV 1992) as "[a] charge against or interest in property to secure payment of
a debt or performance of an obligation."
8. Perfection is the act which serves to protect the lienor's interest in the property as

against third parties.

BLACK'S

LAW DICTIONARY

1137 (6th ed. 1990). Lien creation and

perfection are discussed infra part IV.
9. The issues dealt with herein can arise, and will be dealt with similarly, if it is the
contractor or a subcontractor who is the debtor. See infra part III.
10. Lien duration and continuation are discussed infra part VI.
11. Under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988), a mechanic's lien is treated as a secured claim.
The term "trustee" as used herein includes a debtor-in-possession in a Chapter 11 reorganization. See 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (1988).
12. See 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1988) ("A claim or interest, proof of which is filed [by a
creditor] .. . is deemed allowed, unless a party in interest .. .objects.").
13. Section 506(d) provides, in pertinent part: "To the extent that a lien secures a claim
against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void .
11 U.S.C.
§ 506(d) (1988).
14. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992) (holding that § 506(d) of the
Code does not allow the value of an "undersecured" creditor's lien to be reduced to the value
of the collateral).
15. Section 544 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case . . .the rights and
powers of, or may avoid any transfer of property.of the debtor . . .that is voidable
by (1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the commencement of the case, and that obtains, at such time and with respect to such
credit, a judicial lien on all property on which a creditor on a simple contract
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was perfected prepetition.1 7
Moreover, the lien is not avoidable as a statutory lien under section 545,18 and is therefore not avoidable as a preference under section 547.19 It is also highly unlikely that a mechanic's lien could be
avoided by the trustee as a fraudulent conveyance. 0
could have obtained such a judicial lien, whether or not such a creditor exists
11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1988).
16. The trustee, as of the commencement of the case, attains the status of
a bona fide purchaser of real property, other than fixtures, from the debtor, against
whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected, that obtains the status
of a bona fide purchaser and has perfected such transfer at the time of the commencement of the case, whether or not such a purchaser exists.
11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) (1988).
17. As a hypothetical judicial lien creditor, the trustee would be helpless because state
law governs which lienors have priority over others. See, e.g., N.Y. LIEN LAW § 13(1) (McKinney 1993) (stating that "[a] [mechanic's] lien . . . shall have priority over a . . . judgment . . .against such property not . . .docketed [so as to create a judgment lien] . . .at
the time of the filing of the notice of such lien").
Even as a hypothetical bona fide purchaser, the trustee would still be unable to avoid the
mechanic's lien under § 544(a)(3), because the wording of that subsection applies only to
transfers not perfected at the time the case was commenced. Additionally,
[t]he trustee may avoid the fixing of a statutory lien on property of the debtor to the
extent that such lien . . . (2) is not perfected or enforceable at the time of the
commencement of the case against a bona fide purchaser that purchases such property at the time of the commencement of the case, whether or not such a purchaser
exists ....
I1 U.S.C § 545(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 545.
19. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(6) (1988) ("The trustee may not avoid under this section a
transfer . . . (6) that is the fixing of a statutory lien that is not avoidable under section 545 of
this title ....
"); see also Town of Colchester v. Hinesburg Sand and Gravel, Inc. (In re
APC Constr., Inc.), 112 B.R. 89 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1990) [hereinafter APC Constr.-l], affd sub
nor. Glinka v. Hinesburg Sand and Gravel, Inc. (In re APC Constr., Inc.), 132 B.R. 690 (D.
Vt. 1991) [hereinafter APC Constr.-!l]. "[T]he purpose of section 547(c)(6) was fairly clear
....
[T]he draftsmen did not intend the liens to be subject to a second scrutiny under section
547." 112 B.R. at 125-26. But see Klein v. Lionel Leisure, Inc. (In re Lionel Leisure, Inc.),
159 B.R. 410, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that a mechanic's lien, notice of which was not
filed within the "relate-back period of [N.Y.] Lien Law section 13(5)" did not qualify as a
statutory lien within the meaning of § 547(c)(6) and was thus voidable as a preference under
§ 547(b)).
20. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (governing fraudulent conveyances
and obligations). However, enforcement of a mechanic's lien receives different treatment: a
conveyance of real property following a sale in foreclosure of such a lien might be attacked as
fraudulent, applying the rule of Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir.
1980) (holding a mortgage foreclosure sale to be a fraudulent conveyance, due to the lack of
"reasonably equivalent value" under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1988), where the price paid
was less than 70% of the value of the property). This rule, however, has not been adopted by
all of the Circuit Courts of Appeal, and will be resolved shortly by the Supreme Court. See
BFP v. Imperial Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re BFP), 974 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. granted
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On the other hand, a mechanic's lien that comes into existence
or is perfected postpetition could be attacked by the trustee21 under
either section 544 or 545 of the Code. 2 Additionally, under section
549,23 "the trustee may avoid a transfer of property of the estate...
that occurs after the commencement of the case. "24
In any event, the trustee's avoiding powers under section 544,
545 or 549 of the Code may be ineffective against a mechanic's lien
where applicable state lien law permits the postpetition perfection of
such a lien to relate back25 to a date prior to the commencement of
the case.2 6 Generally, however, the trustee's position is that this type
of postpetition activity violates the automatic stay.2 7 For example, in
sub nom. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2411 (1993).
21. Or, possibly, the debtor in a case involving an exemption. 11 U.S.C. § 522(h)
(1988); see, e.g., In re Saberman, 3 B.R. 316 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1980).
22. Cf. King Rd. Materials, Inc. v. Severson Acres Dev. Corp. (In re Severson Acres
Dev. Corp.), 142 B.R. 59, 60 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1992) (rejecting the trustee's contention that
a mechanic's lien filed postpetition should be deemed to have been filed immediately before the
date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, pursuant to section 547(e)(2)(C), and stating
that "[s]ection 547(c)(6) provides ... that ... liens duly filed [postpetition] pursuant to state
law are not avoidable under section 545").
23. 11 U.S.C. § 549 (1988).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 549(a)(1). The creation of a mechanic's lien constitutes a "transfer," as
that term is defined in II U.S.C. § 101(54) (Supp. IV 1992).
In an involuntary case, however, governed by 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1988), the trustee cannot
avoid a mechanic's lien that arises after the commencement of the case but prior to the order
for relief "to the extent any ... services [were] ... given after the commencement of the case
in exchange for such transfer, notwithstanding any notice or knowledge of the case that the
transferee has." 11 U.S.C. § 549(b).
25. See infra part IV for a discussion of some of the various state statutes that have
been construed to effect a relation back of perfection.
26. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(b) (1988); see also In re Severson Acres Dev. Corp., 142 B.R.
59; Butler Constr. Co. v. America Bluegrass Marble Co. (In re Butler), 110 B.R. 281 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 1989); In re Brittian, 106 B.R. 665 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1989); Schiffer v. Arvada
Steel Fabricating Co. (In re Cantrup), 38 B.R. 148 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1984); Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Hamlin (In re Hamlin), 34 B.R. 673 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983); RSJ Constr. Corp. v.
C.H. Stuart, Inc. (In re C.H. Stuart, Inc.), 17 B.R. 400 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1982); First Am.
Title Co. v. Design Builders, Inc. (In re Design Builders, Inc.), 18 B.R. 392 (Bankr. D. Idaho
1981); cf. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Bailey (In re Cutty's-Gurnee, Inc.), 133 B.R. 929 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding the language of § 545(2) to be discretionary rather than mandatory).
But see ATC Sys., Inc. v. Valairco, Inc. (In re Valairco, Inc.), 9 B.R. 289 (Bankr. D.N.J.
1981) (postpetition filing of New Jersey "stop notice" did not relate back, so it violated stay);
In re Saberman, 3 B.R. 316 (Bankr. N.D. I11.1980) (relation-back not available to a lienor, as
against a trustee asserting the status of a bona fide purchaser, who filed subsequent to the
expiration of the mandated four-month period after completion of the work); In re Chesterfield
Developers, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding that the postpetition perfection
of a mechanic's lien, as a statutory lien, effective against a trustee under section 67(c)(1) of
the Bankruptcy Act, the predecessor to § 545 of the Code).
27. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988) (staying various actions taken by creditors against the
debtor).

19931

MECHANICS LIENS IN THE FACE OF A STAY

In re APC Construction, Inc.,2 8 the bankruptcy court, construing
Vermont's Contractor's Lien Statutes, 29 held that the postpetition
perfection of such a lien would relate back to the date of "visible
commencement of work.""0 As the lien involved in the case was
based upon work commenced prior to the bankruptcy, the postpetition perfection related back to a prepetition date, rendering the lien
immune to trustee attack under sections 544, 545 and 547 of the
Code.3 1 The court held that such postpetition perfection did not violate the automatic stay. 2
The balance of this article deals with the automatic stay, as it
may affect the creation, perfection, continuation or enforcement of a
mechanic's lien. Additionally, in connection with lien continuation or
enforcement activity, the "tolling" effect of section 108(c) 33 is
discussed.3 4

II.

CODE SECTIONS APPLICABLE TO POSTPETITION ACTIVITY

Section 362(a) provides that a petition filed under section 301
(voluntary case), 302 (joint case), or 303 (involuntary case) of the
Code "operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of ...any act to
create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate."3 5
However, section 362(b) provides that "[t]he filing of a petition . . .
does not operate as a stay . . .under subsection (a) of this section,
of any act to perfect an interest in property to the extent that the
trustee's rights and powers are subject to such perfection under section 546(b) of this title.""5
28. 112 B.R. 89 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1990), affid sub noma.
APC Constr.-JI, 132 B.R. 690 (D.
Vt. 1991).
29. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 1921-24 (1984), reproduced by the court in APC Constr.1, 112 B.R. at 100-01.
30. APC Constr.-I, 112 B.R. at 121.
31. Id. at 120-26.
32. Id. at 110-17. On appeal, the District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's decision insofar as it rejected the trustee's contention that the lien could be avoided under
§ 544(a)(1) or § 547(b) as a preference. APC Constr.-I, 132 B.R. at 692, 694-96. However,
the District Court did not reach the issues relating to the automatic stay. Id. at 692.
33. 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) (1988).
34. See infra parts VI-VII.
35. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4).
36. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (emphasis added). Subsection
(b)(3) further provides that the stay is not effective "to the extent that such [perfection] is
accomplished within the period provided under section 547(e)(2)(A) of this title." 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(e)(2)(A) provides that "a transfer is [deemed to have been] made ... at the time such
transfer takes effect between the transferor and the transferee, if such transfer is perfected at,
or within 10 days after, such time."
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Section 546(b), in turn, provides as follows:
The rights and powers of a trustee under sections 544, 545, and
549 of this title are subject to any generally applicable law that
permits perfection of an interest in property to be effective against
an entity that acquires rights in such property before the date of
such perfection. If such law requires seizure of such property or
commencement of an action to accomplish such perfection, and
such property has not been seized or such action has not been commenced before the date of the filing of the petition, such interest in
such property shall be perfected by notice within the time fixed by
such law for such seizure or commencement."7
The purpose of section 546(b) "is to protect, in spite of the surprise
intervention of [a] bankruptcy petition, those whom State law protects by allowing them to perfect their liens or interests as of an
effective date that is earlier than the date of perfection."3 8
Consider the second sentence of section 546(b).3 9 The failure to
comply with this provision has only infrequently been relied upon by
bankruptcy trustees to defeat postpetition mechanics' liens. Specifically, trustees have contended that applicable state lien laws require
that an action to foreclose a lien be commenced as part of the process of perfecting the lien. Therefore, since the required notice of
section 546(b) was not given as a substitute for the commencement
of such an action, there was no perfection that. could have related
back to a prepetition time. In In re Coated Sales, Inc.,4" the lienor
commenced a postpetition action to enforce a lien. The court concluded that under applicable Rhode Island law, an action to enforce
Presumably, § 362(b)(3), in conjunction with § 547(e)(2)(A), would preserve a
mechanic's lien that, under applicable state law, was created prepetition but perfected postpetition, with no more than 10 days separating the two events. A relation-back feature is thus
built into § 547(e)(2)(A) itself; if the section is applicable, one need not look to state law for a
relation-back of perfection.
37. 11 U.S.C. § 546(b) (emphasis added).
38. H.R. REP. No 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 371 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6327.
39. The second sentence of 11 U.S.C. § 546(b) reads as follows:
If such law requires seizure of such property or commencement of an action to
accomplish such perfection, and such property has not been seized or such action
has not been commenced before the date of the filing of the petition, such interest in
such property shall be perfected by notice within the time fixed by such law for such
seizure or commencement.
Section 362(b)(3), as applied in conjunction with the first sentence of section 546(b), will
be considered infra part IV.
40. Roofing Concepts, Inc. v. Kenyon Indus., Inc. (In re Coated Sales, Inc.), 147 B.R.
842 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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the lien was a necessary predicate to perfection.4 Thus, for a postpetition perfection to relate back, notice was required by the second

sentence of section 546(b) as a substitute for the enforcement action.
The court found such notice to be present, however, when the lienor
filed a secured claim with the bankruptcy court within the time limit
for perfection prescribed by state law."' Therefore, although the
commencement of a lien enforcement action was technically a violation of the automatic stay, the court refused to read section 546(b)
as precluding perfection due to such a violation.4 3

III. A

THRESHOLD QUESTION RELATING TO "PROPERTY OF THE
ESTATE"

The automatic stay operates against "any act to create, perfect,
or enforce any lien against the property of the estate."" Thus, ab-

sent a showing of unusual circumstances, 45 the automatic stay does
not apply to protect non-debtors or their property. 46 For example,
41.

Id. at 844.

42. Id. at 846. But see In re Birdview Satellite Communications, Inc., 90 B.R. 465
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1988) (holding that an action to enforce a lien was a necessary step for
perfection; however, because no substitute notice was given pursuant to the second sentence of
§ 546(b), the lien lapsed and was avoidable by the trustee).
43.

In re Coated Sales, Inc., 147 B.R. at 847; cf. H.T. Bowling, Inc. v. Bain (In re

Bain), 64 B.R. 581 (W.D. Va. 1986) (filing a postpetition complaint in action to foreclose a
mechanic's lien related to enforcement and thus violated the automatic stay; however, the
postpetition filing of a memorandum of lien served, nevertheless, to perfect such lien, and such
perfection related back, thereby defeating the trustee).
However, some courts have held against the trustee, finding that under applicable state
law the commencement of an action related only to enforcement and would therefore be subject to the automatic stay. Thus, if the lienor had taken all other steps necessary for perfection,
such perfection would not be lost due to the failure to commence an action to foreclose the lien
(or to give the substitute notice of section 546(b)) within the applicable state statutory period.
See Schiffer v. Arvada Steel Fabricating Co. (In re Cantrup), 38 B.R. 148 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1984); First Am. Title Co. v. Design Builders, Inc. (In re Design Builders, Inc.), 18 B.R. 392
(Bankr. D. Idaho 1981).
44. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) (emphasis added). 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)
defines "property of the estate."
45. See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank v. Third Eighty-Ninth Assocs. (In re Third
Eighty-Ninth Assocs.), 138 B.R. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (extending automatic stay to cover a
non-debtor guarantor because, due to the relationship between the guarantor and the debtor,
allowing an action to proceed against said guarantor would burden the Chapter 11 estate); cf.
Credit Alliance Corp. v. Williams, 851 F.2d 119 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding nothing "unusual"
about a guaranty arrangement to allow guarantor to invoke the protections of the automatic
stay); Hudgins v. Life Say. Bank (In re Hudgins), 153 B.R. 441 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993).
46. "The automatic stay of section 362(a) protects only the debtor, property of the
debtor or property of the estate." Advanced Ribbons and Office Prods., Inc. v. U.S. Interstate
Distrib. Co. (In re Advanced Ribbons and Office Prods., Inc.), 125 B.R. 259, 263 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1991) (holding the automatic stay inapplicable to foreclosure sale of stock of a debtor-
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when the maker of a note files for bankruptcy, the automatic stay
will not preclude an action against a guarantor,"' the foreclosure of a
mortgage,4 8 or the enforcement of a U.C.C. security interest 9 on
non-debtor property given to secure such a note. So, if a mechanic's
lien exists, and the debtor is the owner of real property improved by
the labor or materials supplied by the lienor, the lien will be asserted
directly against the debtor-owner's real property, which is property
of the estate,5" and will therefore be subject to the automatic stay.
But, what if the debtor is a contractor of the owner of the real property, and a subcontractor or materialman of such contractor seeks to
create, perfect or enforce a lien against the real property of the nondebtor owner?5 1 Should this act be subject to the stay?
Consider the following proposition: if subcontractor (SC) of
debtor-contractor (C) were to enforce a lien against the property of
the owner (0), the amount owed by 0 to C should be discounted to
the extent of the lien. Arguably, therefore, since C's estate would be
diminished in an amount equal to the value of the lien, the stay
should preclude enforcement of the lien. As one court concluded,
[u]nder Vermont law, a subcontractor is entitled to a contractor's
lien [on an owner's real property] only to the extent any monies are
owed from the owner to the general contractor .

. .

. To the ex-

tent the . . . [owner's] property is used to satisfy the enforcement
of a subcontractor's [lien foreclosure] judgment, the non-debtor
owner, in turn, is entitled to an offset of whatever amount remains
due to the debtor general contractor. The bankruptcy estate [of the
corporation, which was pledged by a non-debtor shareholder as security for the corporate
debt); Alcom Am. Corp. v. Arab Banking Corp. (In re Alcom Am. Corp.), 154 B.R. 97
(Bankr. D.D.C. 1993) (discussing and following Advanced Ribbons). But cf. Valley Transit
Mix of Ruidoso, Inc. v. Miller, 928 F.2d 354 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that the enforcement
of a mechanic's lien was subject to the automatic stay where allowing such enforcement
against the owners of real property would adversely affect the leasehold of the debtor-lessee, as
the leasehold was property of the estate).
47. See, e.g., Credit Alliance Corp., 851 F.2d 119; cf. In re Third Eighty-Ninth Assocs.,
138 B.R. 144.
48. See Saratoga Group, Ltd. v. Peoples Nat'l Bank (In re Geris), 973 F.2d 318 (4th
Cir. 1992); In re Hudgins, 153 B.R. 441; Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. 400 Garden
City Assocs., 568 N.Y.S.2d 505 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
49. See In re Advanced Ribbons and Office Prods., Inc., 125 B.R. 259.
50. See II U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988) ("The commencement of a case ... creates an
estate ... comprised of ... all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case.").
51. Ostensibly, the mechanic's lien situation parallels that in which a mortgagee forecloses on property of a mortgagor who is not the debtor. However, in the mortgage context, the
debtor has no claim against the mortgagor-owner so the foreclosure of the mortgage does not
affect the bankruptcy estate.
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contractor] is thereby diminished by any offset. 52
It would seem, however, that to the extent SC's claim against C is

also satisfied in connection with SC's lien enforcement, there would
be a "wash," with no net diminution of C's estate: for example, if
SC's claim against C were $100 and SC enforced his lien against O's
property at a time when the balance on the O-C contract were $150,
the balance of the contract, and hence C's estate, would be reduced
by $100. In addition, C's estate would be relieved of the $100 obligation owed to SC.
Against this "wash" view, it could be argued that foreclosing a
lien against the property of the non-debtor 0 would enable SC to
recover more than if the claim were asserted directly in C's bankruptcy proceeding, where such claim would be unsecured and most
likely result in SC recovering less than the full amount of its claim.
Although this argument would also apply in third-party mortgage

situations, courts have not relied on it as a basis for enjoining actions
to foreclose such mortgages.
There may be another basis for applying the stay to SC's action
to enforce a mechanic's lien against a non-debtor 0. If the SC foreclosure action were to bypass C, C's possible defenses and/or counterclaims which might serve to offset all or part of SC's claim would
not be heard. C might, therefore, be deemed a necessary party in the
SC foreclosure action, in which case the stay should apply. 53
In a case where a sub-subcontractor (SSC) attempts to enforce
a lien against 0 in satisfaction of a claim against debtor-SC, an
analysis similar to the one above would apply. 54 If 0, whose property
52. APC Constr.-I, 112 B.R. 89, 100 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1990); see also N.Y. LIEN LAW
§ 4(1) (McKinney 1993) ("[T]he lien [of a subcontractor] shall not be for a sum greater than
the sum earned and unpaid on the contract at the time of filing of the notice of lien, and any
sum subsequently earned thereon."); Middleton & Dugger Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Richardson Builders, Inc. (In re Richardson Builders, Inc.), 123 B.R. 736, 740 (Bankr. W.D. Va.
1990); cf. Bricklayers Local Union No. 92 v. Makoroff, 562 N.Y.S.2d 599 (Sup. Ct. 1990)
(lifting the automatic stay in C's bankruptcy proceeding to permit SC's foreclosure action to
proceed against 0; implicitly acknowledging that the stay applied to such action).
53. "The net, or the sum of the claims, offsets and setoffs, as the case may be, affects the
totality of the [contractor's bankruptcy] estate that may be distributed to claimants." APC
Constr.-I, 112 B.R. at 100; see also In re Richardson Builders, Inc., 123 B.R. 736; cf. Diamond Hill Inv. Co. v. Shelden, 767 P.2d 1005 (Wyo. 1989) (staying a lienor from amending a
complaint). But see Weaver v. Jock, 717 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (declining to extend an automatic stay to 0).
54. But cf. Denoyelles Co. v. Requa Elec. Supply Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 753 (Sup. Ct.
1992) (filing proof of service of notice of lien by a materialman in a subcontractor's bankruptcy proceeding was not precluded by the automatic stay).
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is sold to satisfy SSC's claim, has an offset against C on the O-C
contract balance, C should have an offset against SC on the C-SC
contract balance, as SC's obligation to SSC has been satisfied.
Some jurisdictions, however, provide a "trust fund" remedy to
construction claimants. 55 In this situation, the amount owed by 0 to
C would constitute an asset of the trust for which C is trustee and
SC the beneficiary. If, instead of attempting to resort to the lien
remedy, SC resorts to the trust remedy, the stay in C's bankruptcy
should not apply-C's right to payment from 0, which is an asset of
the C trust, is not property of the estate."6
IV.

POSTPETITION CREATION OR PERFECTION OF A LIEN

Reading section 362(b)(3) 57 in conjunction with the first sentence of section 546(b)5 8 leads to the conclusion that postpetition
acts to perfect an "inchoate" 5 9 prepetition lien do not violate the automatic stay. 60 Such postpetition acts must be performed in accordance with,"' and within the time limitations established under, "any
generally applicable law," 6 2 which is usually state lien law, so long
55. See, e.g., N.Y. LIEN LAW §§ 70-71 (McKinney 1993).
56. See, e.g., Jensen v. Pen Air Conditioning, Inc. (In re Winsco Builders, Inc.), 156
B.R. 98 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993) (the earmarking of proceeds to a materialman was not property of the debtor-contractor's estate); Cooper v. Grisofe Elec. Corp. (In re Building Dynamics, Inc.), 134 B.R. 715 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding payments made to subcontractors
within the preference period to constitute a transfer of trust assets under New York's Lien
Law, and therefore not property of the estate).
57. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
58. 11 U.S.C. § 546(b) (1988).
59. See APC Constr.-I, 112 B.R. 89, 93-94 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1990) (defining an inchoate
lien to be both contingent and unliquidated) (citing Bernstein v. Held (In re Bernstein), 62
B.R. 545, 549 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986)).
60. See Lincoln Say. Bank v. Suffolk County Treasurer (In re Parr Meadows Racing
Ass'n), 880 F.2d 1540 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1058 (1990); Watervliet Paper
Co. v. City of Watervliet (In re Shoreham Paper Co.), 117 B.R. 274 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1990) (noting that if a creditor has a prepetition interest in property and state law provides for
perfection of a lien based on that interest, as long as it is perfected within the time provided by
state law, the lien will not lose its preferred status); In re PDQ Copy Center, Inc., 27 B.R. 123
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (finding that postpetition receipt of funds by an attorney related back
to the prepetition time that the attorney commenced action in favor of his client, at which time
the attorney's statutory charging lien arose). Contra Makoroff v. City of Lockport, 916 F.2d
890 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that liens created after bankruptcy petition did not relate back to
a prepetition interest in the debtor's property; the court applied New York law but declined to
adopt the view of the Second Circuit).
61. See Rooks v. Peek Constr. Co. (In re Peek Constr. Co.), 80 B.R. 226 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 1986) (losing liens by failure to take steps to perfect postpetition).
62. I1 U.S.C. § 546(b); see, e.g., In re Willax. 93 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1937); LoPriore v.
Imperia Bros. Inc. (In re LoPriore), 115 B.R. 462 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (assuming relation-
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as such law is applicable "both in bankruptcy cases and outside of
bankruptcy cases."63 The state law must operate in a manner such
that the postpetition perfection "relates back" to a prepetition date.6 '
However, state lien laws vary considerably: "[t]o be sure, an
examination of the peculiarities of each State's law on mechanics' . . . liens is required to determine if applicable State law will
permit the application of the relation back rule."6 5 Typically,
though, under those state laws which provide for it, lien perfection
relates back to either the time that work commenced or the materials were furnished. 6 Thus, under such laws, the prepetition commencement of work may justify the postpetition perfection of a
lien.67
Consider, for instance, In re APC Construction,Inc.,68 in which
the Vermont lien statutes were in dispute. In pertinent part, such
statutes provided as follows: (1) when an improvement contract is
made with an owner of real property, "the person proceeding in pursuance of such contract . . .shall have a lien upon such [improvements];"9 (2) when a contract is made with a contractor or subcontractor, the person who performs labor or furnishes materials shall
have a lien by giving notice in writing to the owner that he shall
back, but the lien lost by failure of the lienor to serve a copy of the notice of lien upon the
owner within the 30-day period required by § 11 of the New York Lien Law).
63. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5872; H.R. REp. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 371 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6327.
64. The term "relation back" is not found in the statute itself, but is used in the Senate
and House Reports and is uniformly used by the courts in their interpretations of section
546(b) of the Code. See, e.g., In re Neylon, 18 B.R. 765, 767 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1982); see
also infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. It should also be noted that most courts have
not required the "generally applicable law," for purposes of § 546(b), to expressly provide that
perfection be effective. In most of the cases cited herein, the law in question was, on its face, a
pure priority statute.
65. APC Constr.-I, 112 B.R. at 112.

66. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-3-535(5) (1993) ("a lien attaches at the commencement of work"); In re Brittian, 106 B.R. 665 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1989).
67. See WWG Indus. v. United Textiles, Inc. (In re WWG Indus.), 772 F.2d 810 (11th
Cir. 1985); Yobe Elec. Inc. v. Graybar Elec. Co. (In re Yobe Elec. Inc.), 728 F.2d 207 (3d
Cir. 1984); In re U.S. Elec., Inc., 123 B.R. 262 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990); In re Brittian, 106
B.R. 665; In re Murphy Elec. Co., 78 B.R. 451 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1987); In re Peek Constr. Co.,
80 B.R. 226; Victoria Grain Co. of Minneapolis v. Janesville Elevator Constr. Co. (In re Victoria Grain Co. of Minneapolis), 45 B.R. 2 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984); In re Neylon, 18 B.R. 765;
see also In re Fiorillo & Co., 19 B.R. 21 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
68.

APC Constr.-I, 112 B.R. 89 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1990), affd sub nom. In re APC Con-

str.-II, 132 B.R. 690 (D. Vt. 1991).
69. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 1921(a) (1984).
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claim a lien;70 (3) a lien shall not continue in force for more than.
sixty days from the time when payment became due for the last of
such labor or materials, unless a notice of such lien is filed in the
office of the town clerk; 1 (4) a person claiming a lien shall file in the
office of the town clerk a written memorandum "which shall charge
such real estate with such lien as of the visible commencement of
work or delivery of material;"' 7" (5) within three months from the
time of filing such memorandum, "such person may commence his
action for the same, and cause such real estate . . . to be attached
thereon;" (6) within five months after the date of the judgment in
such action, the plaintiff in such action may record a copy of the
judgment in the office of the town clerk. Thereupon the real property
shall be holden for the amount due upon such judgment . . . as if
it had been mortgaged for the payment thereof, from the time of
the visible commencement of work or delivery of materials . . .
and the plaintiff may obtain possession and foreclose74 the defendant's equity of redemption as in case of a mortgage.
The lienor in APC Construction had sold materials to the
debtor in November and December of 1988, and recorded a timely
notice of lien on January 24, 1989. However, a pre-judgment writ of
attachment against the debtor's property was not obtained until
March 28, eighteen days after the debtor's bankruptcy petition was
filed. 75 The court determined "the attachment process [to be] an indispensable element toward obtaining pre-judgment perfection of a
contractor's lien." 76 Although perfection was achieved postpetition, it
77
had still occurred within the time limitation set by Vermont law.
The "timely perfected contractor's lien [under Vermont state law]
will relate back to the time of recording of a notice of lienor 'visible
commencement' of work."'7 8 Thus, the court held that postpetition
perfection was permissible pursuant to section 546(b) of the Code 79
70. Id. § 1921(b).
71. Id. § 1921(c).
72. Id. § 1923 (emphasis added).
73. Id. § 1924.
74. Id. § 1925 (emphasis added).
75. APC Constr.-l, 112 B.R. at 92-93.
76. Id. at 101.
77. The time limit was three months. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 1924.
78. APC Constr.-I, 112 B.R. at 117.
79. 11 U.S.C § 546(b). The court also determined that the postpetition perfection related back to a prepetition date so as to defeat the trustee's alternative contentions that the
lien could be avoided pursuant to section 544, 545 or 547 of the Code. APC Constr.-!, 112
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and not subject to the automatic stay.80
Arguably, the court could have found the lien to be perfected at
the time the notice of lien was filed with the town clerk, 1 which
appears to be the critical time for determining the lienor's status as
against the trustee's avoiding powers under sections 544 and 545 of
the Code. This is because under Vermont law the trustee, standing
in the shoes of a bona fide purchaser at the time of the bankruptcy
filing, may avoid a lien that was filed postpetition, but not one filed
prepetition.8" Whether or not the writ of attachment was obtained
seems to be immaterial. Therefore, in APC Construction, since the
filing was effected prepetition, the court did not have to reach the
section 546(b) relation-back question, which would have been necessary had both the filing and the writ of attachment been effected
postpetition.
If a lien does not relate back under applicable state law, however, sections 362(b)(3) and 546(b) of the Code have no application,
and the automatic stay will be violated by a lienor's attempt at
postpetition perfection.
No mention is made [in the legislative history of section 546(b)] of
liens which do not relate back for presumably the drafters of the
Bankruptcy Code intended that, absent language within the state
statute giving rise to a purported lien, it must be assumed that such
liens are susceptible to the trustee's avoiding power."3
For instance, in New Jersey, if a contract between the general
contractor and the owner has been filed, a subcontractor may not
obtain a lien on the owner's real property. Instead, by filing a "stop
notice," the subcontractor may acquire a lien on the amounts owed
to the contractor by the owner-a form of garnishment. " Until the
stop notice is filed, a claimant's interest in the owner's funds is
merely an "inchoate property right," an "equitable interest," or "an
inchoate lien."18 5 It is, however, an interest sufficient to be treated as
property of a debtor-claimant's estate.
B.R. at 121-26. On appeal, the district court affirmed the judgment of the bankruptcy court.
APC Constr.-H, 132 B.R. 690; see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
80. APC Constr.-I, 112 B.R. at 126.
81. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 1921(c), 1923.

82. Id.§ 1921(d).
83. ATC Sys., Inc. v. Valairco, Inc. (In re Valairco, Inc.), 9 B.R. 289, 294 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1981).
84. See id. at 293-94.
85. Brainum v. Shore Air Conditioning & Refrigeration, Inc. (In re Shore Air Conditioning & Refrigeration, Inc.), 18 B.R. 643, 646 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1982).
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For example, it has been held that the filing of a stop notice by
a debtor-subcontractor's materialman violated the automatic stay. 86
Both the subcontractor and the materialman had "identical, equitable interests in the funds in the owners' hands in the nature of inchoate liens."8' 7 As to the debtor-subcontractor, the interest was property of the estate. As to the materialman, allowing the filing of a
stop notice, and hence the acquisition of a postpetition lien, would be
an improvement of the materialman's position to the detriment of
the debtor-subcontractor's estate. 8 Moreover, the materialman is not
protected from the effects of the stay by section 546(b) of the Code
because "the [postpetition] filing of a Stop Notice does not relate
back to the [prepetition] time of supplying of materials or rendering
of services, but is effective as of the date of filing with the Owner." 89
Another example is Pennsylvania, where a lien
shall take effect and have priority:
(a) In the case of the erection or construction of an improvement, as of the date of the visible commencement upon the
ground of the work of erecting or constructing the improvement; and
(b) In the case of the alterationor repairof an improvement,
as of the date of filing of the claim. 90
In In re Poloron Products of Bloomsburg, Inc.,9 1 the claimant
had visually commenced work on November 14, 1986, which included replacing three steel overhead sectional doors and one steel
roll-up door, repairing the tracks of other doors, and replacing panels
in certain doors. 92 The lien claim was not filed until January 30,
1987, after the owner's filing of a bankruptcy petition on December
22, 1986."' The court found that the claimant's work constituted an
"alteration or repair," rather than an "erection or construction." ' 4
The postpetition perfection of the lien on January 30, therefore, did
not relate back to November 14, thus subjecting the claimant to the
automatic stay.95
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See id.
Id.
Id. at 647.
In re Valairco, Inc., 9 B.R. at 293 (emphasis added).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1508 (1965) (emphasis added).
76 B.R. 383 (Bankr. M.D.-Pa. 1987).

92.

Id. at 384.

93.
94.

Id.
Id. at 385.

95.

Id. Compare Yobe Elec., Inc. v. Graybar Elec. Co. (In re Yobe Elec., Inc.), 728
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V.

POSTPETITION PERFECTION IN NEW YORK:

A UNIQUE

APPROACH

In New York, a mechanic's lien is created by the filing of a
notice of lien with the clerk of the county wherein the real property
is located.96 Perfection issues aside, however, it would appear as
though a postpetition lien filing violates the automatic stay as an
"act to create . . . [a] lien against property of the estate"97 of a
debtor-owner. This is because the relation-back provided for by sections 362(b)(3) and 546(b) of the Code only apply to an act to perfect or the actual perfection of a lien. So far, though, no New York
court has directly addressed the "creation" aspect of a lien filing;9 8
instead, the focus has been on the filing as an act of perfection
only."
Under section 3 of the New York Lien Law, a lien arises simultaneously with its own perfection; that is, the act of filing serves to
both create and perfect the lien.100 Thus, there is no preexisting lien
to which the perfection can relate back, as that expression is used in
the Senate Report, 10 1 or in those cases which have construed state
F.2d 207 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding a postpetition filing to have related back to the prepetition
date when materials were furnished and therefore, no violation of the automatic stay).
96. See N.Y. LIEN LAW § 3 (McKinney 1993) ("A contractor, subcontractor, laborer,
[or]
materialman ...who performs labor or furnishes materials for the improvement of real
property with the consent or at the request of the owner . . .shall have a lien . . .upon the
real property improved . . .from the time of filing a notice of lien .... ").

97. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) (1988) (emphasis added). For the case of a lien asserted by a
subcontractor in the bankruptcy proceeding of a contractor as affecting property of the contractor's estate, see supra part Il.
98. Contra Makoroff v. City of Lockport, 916 F.2d 890, 895-96 (3d Cit. 1990) (holding
that postpetition acts to perfect a lien violated the automatic stay because no perfectible interest in the property had attached prepetition), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 983 (1991); cf. Lincoln
Say. Bank v. Suffolk County Treasurer, (In re Parr Meadows Racing Ass'n), 880 F.2d 1540,
1548 (2d Cir. 1989) (speaking to the creation issue indirectly, the court held that a real estate
tax lien, created postpetition, related back under § 546(b) so as to fall within the § 362(b)(3)
exception to the automatic stay), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1058 (1990).
99. The courts applying New York law have accepted the general proposition that the
creation aspect of an act that also has a perfection aspect should be disregarded if the perfection aspect relates back under section 546(b). Arguably, however, because only the perfection
aspect is covered by section 546(b), the creation aspect should remain subject to the stay. For
a recent non-New York case explicitly accepting the above proposition, see In re Microfab,
Inc., 105 B.R. 152, 160 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989). The second sentence of § 546(b) of the Code
covers an act that has both perfection and enforcement aspects, and provides a way for the
lienor to avoid the stay with respect to enforcement. However, the situation where an act has
both a creation and a perfection aspect is not expressly covered by section 546(b).
100.

N.Y. LIEN LAW § 3 ("A ...materialman ...

of filing a notice of such lien .... ).
101. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.

shall have a lien ...

from the time
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lien laws under which a lien arises upon the commencement of the
lienor's work."0 2 Therefore, under the New York statute, it would
seem that a postpetition filing cannot be saved from the stay by relation back to a prepetition date of commencement of work. The cases
hereinafter considered, however, suggest the contrary and would preserve a lien created and perfected by a postpetition filing.
A.

Section 544(a)(1) of the Code

There is a line of New York cases, antedating the present Bankruptcy Code, in which the courts have held that the trustee could not
avoid a mechanic's lien filed after the debtor's adjudication in bankruptcy. In Crane Co. v. Smythe, 0 3 a case decided before the trustee
was accorded hypothetical judicial lienor status, the court held that
the bankruptcy of an owner did not affect the right of a materialman
to file a notice of lien thereafter. 04 The court purported to follow the
prior nonbankruptcy case of John P. Kane Co. v. Kinney,10 5 in which
the New York Court of Appeals held that an assignee for the benefit
of creditors took subject to later-filed mechanics' liens.' 0 6 The court
in Crane Co. assumed that voluntary proceedings in bankruptcy
would have the same effect as a general assignment for the benefit of
creditors, and held that the post-adjudication lien was good as
against the trustee. 07 The court rejected the contention that bankruptcy proceedings were broader and more effective than general assignments.10 8 Under the then-applicable bankruptcy statute, the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898,109 the trustee was vested with no greater or
broader rights than the bankrupt. This view was adopted by later
courts, even after the bankruptcy statute had been amended in 1910
to give the trustee the rights of a creditor holding a lien; 110 "[t]he
102. See supra note 67.
103. 87 N.Y.S. 917 (App. Div. 1904).
104. Id. at 920.
105. 66 N.E. 619 (N.Y. 1903) (holding that during the statutory period, a claimant was
permitted to file a notice of lien, as there was "a preferential statutory right, in the nature of
an unperfected equitable lien," which could not have been defeated by the voluntary act of the
debtor).
106. Id. at 619-20.
107. Crane Co., 87 N.Y.S. at 920.
108. Id.
109. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544.
110. See New York-Brooklyn Fuel Corp. v. Fuller, 11 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1926); Church
E. Gates & Co. v. Stevens Constr. Co., 115 N.E. 22 (N.Y. 1917); Hildreth Granite Co. v. City
of Watervliet, 146 N.Y.S. 449 (App. Div. 1914); cf. In re Willax, 93 F.2d 293, 295 (2d Cir.
1937) ("[A]n adjudication in bankruptcy does not prevent a claimant from perfecting a lien as
distinguished from enforcing it.") (emphasis added); Brower v. Schlott (In re Weston), 68
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amendment of the Bankruptcy Law was not intended to enlarge the
rights of a trustee as against lienors under our statute, but to enable
the trustee to avoid secret and unsecured liens created by act of the

bankrupt.""'1
Under section 544(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee
may avoid a transfer that is voidable by a creditor with a judicial
lien. 1 The "transfer" may take the form of a mechanic's lien, created or perfected by filing a notice of lien. What are the rights of a
judicial lien creditor, as against a mechanic's lienor, under New
York law? A judicial lien, assumed to be present at the time of
bankruptcy filing, would be subordinate to a subsequent mechanic's

lien if the claim upon which the judicial lien was based was unrelated to the improvement for which the mechanic's lien was asserted.1"1 By implication, a judicial lien based upon a claim related
to the improvement would have priority over a subsequent
mechanic's lien." 4 If the trustee may assume the status of a judicial
lien creditor whose claim relates to the improvement, he or she
should be able to avoid a postpetition mechanic's lien. If, however,
the trustee must assume the status of a judicial lien creditor whose
claim is not related to the improvement, the mechanic's lien may not
be avoided. This result is consistent with the pre-Code cases' 1 5 and,
F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1934).
In In re Chesterfield Developers, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), the court considered the predecessor to § 545 of the Code, Bankruptcy Act § 67(c)(1)(B), Pub L. No. 89495, 80 Stat. 268 (1966), repealed by Title IV of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat.) 2549, 2682. However, the old section 67(c)(1)(B)
included a lien creditor component, along with a bona fide purchaser component. As to the
former, the court, without analysis, concluded that "[an examination of [section] 13 of the
[New York] Lien Law indicates that the mechanic's lienor will have priority over any type
[of] creditor." Chesterfield Developers, 285 F. Supp. at 692.
111. Church E. Gates & Co., 115 N.E. at 24.
112. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1).
113. See N.Y. LIEN LAW § 13(1) (McKinney 1993) which provides that
[a mechanic's] lien . . . shall have priority over . . .a money judgment hereafter
recovered upon a claim, which, in whole or in part, was not for materials furnished,
labor performed or moneys advanced for the improvement of such real property; and
over any claim or lien acquired in any proceedings upon such judgment.
114. See City and County Say. Bank v. Oakwood Holding Corp., 387 N.Y.S.2d 512
(Sup. Ct. 1976).
115. See supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text; cf. King Rd. Materials, Inc. v.
Severson Acres Dev. Corp. (In re Severson Acres Dev. Corp.), 142 B.R. 59, 60 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that the postpetition filing of a lien could not be avoided as a preferential transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 547, but stating, in dictum, that postpetition perfection
would not be subject to the trustee's attack under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) and that "[tihe
relation-back procedure set forth in § 15 [sic] of the lien law of the State of New York is
recognized by § 546(b) of the Code").
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ostensibly, finds support in section 546(b); the trustee's avoiding
power under section 544(a)(1) is "subject to any generally applicable law [(e.g., N.Y. Lien Law)] that permits perfection, [albeit creation, as well, by filing pursuant to N.Y. Lien Law § 3], . . .to be
effective against an entity [(e.g., a judicial lien creditor with a claim
unrelated to the improvement)] that acquires rights in such property
before the date of such perfection." 11' 6
However, how does one choose the type of judicial lien creditor
whose status the trustee is to assume for the purpose of testing the
validity of the lienor's postpetition perfection? May the trustee
choose, or the lienor? The trustee argues that it is immaterial that
there may be, hypothetically, a judicial lien creditor who might not
prevail against the subsequent mechanic's lienor; it should be sufficient that the trustee can point to a lien creditor who would prevail
against the mechanic's lienor. Thus, the trustee should be able to
assume the status of that creditor and avoid the lien under section
544(a)(1). 7 The lienor counters that in order to prevail under the
limitation of section 546(b) on the avoiding power of the trustee
under section 544(a)(1), all that needs to be shown is that the
postpetition perfection of the lien was effective against "an entity"-a hypothetical judicial lien creditor-whose claim was not related to the improvement.1 1 8
B.

Section 544(a)(3) of the Code 1 9

Here, the question is whether a trustee, assumed to have the
status of a bona fide purchaser at the time of bankruptcy filing, can
prevail against a subsequent mechanic's lienor. Under New York
Lien Law Section 13(5),2 ° a mechanic's lienor would prevail against
116. 11 U.S.C. § 546(b) (emphasis added).
117. Id. § 544(a)(1).
118. The trustee's status is that of "a creditor on a simple contract [who has] ...
obtained such a judicial lien." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, priority vel non for the trustee
turns on whether a claim related to the specific improvement is treated as a claim arising from
a simple contract.
119. Id. § 544(a)(3). This inartfully drafted section probably stands for the proposition
that the trustee may assume the status of, and avoid any transfer that is voidable by, a bona
fide purchaser from the debtor, against whom applicable law permits such transfer (i.e., the
referenced voidable transfer) to be perfected, that obtains the status of a bona fide purchaser
and has perfected such transfer at the time of the commencement of the case, whether or not
such a purchaser exists.
120. N.Y. LIEN LAW § 13(5) (McKinney 1993) provides:
No instrument of conveyance recorded subsequent to the commencement of the improvement, and before expiration of the period specified in section 10 of this chapter
for filing of notice of lien after the completion of the improvement, shall be valid as
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the grantee of a prior conveyance (to wit, the trustee as bona fide
purchaser) only if (1) the lien was filed within eight months' 21 after
the recording of the deed to such grantee and (2) such deed did not
contain a special trust fund covenant. 2 ' The grantee would take free

of the subsequent lien if either of the two conditions were not met.
Assume that a mechanic's lien that is based upon a postpetition
filing made more than eight months after the bankruptcy filing will

not be valid in any event. The critical inquiry, then, for a lien filing
made within eight months after the bankruptcy filing, will relate to
the trust fund covenant: for the purpose of section 546(b), is the
trustee (as "an entity") to be considered a bona fide purchaser

(grantee) whose deed contains the trust fund covenant or one whose
deed does not contain such covenant? If the former, the trustee may
avoid the lien. 123 If the latter, the lien perfection is "effective against
an entity [(i.e., the grantee whose deed does not contain the cove-

nant)] that acquires rights in such property before the date of such
perfection,"' 24 and the lien is saved. Again, the question is: who
25
chooses the trustee's status? The trustee or the lienor?1
C.

Section 545(2) of the Code

In In re C. H. Stuart, Inc.,' 26 a contractor filed a notice of
against liens filed within a corresponding period of time measured from the recording of such conveyance, unless the instrument contains a covenant by the grantor
that he will receive the consideration as a trust fund to be applied first for the
purpose of paying the cost of the improvement ....
N.Y. LIEN LAW § 10(1) (McKinney 1993) states that a
[n]otice of lien may be filed at any time during the progress of the work and the
furnishing of the materials, or, within eight months [(four months in the case of an
improvement relating to a single-family dwelling)] after the completion of the contract, or the final performance of the work, or the final furnishing of the materials,
dating from the last item of work performed or materials furnished ....
121. The period is four months if the improvement is related to real property improved
or to be improved with a single family dwelling. See N.Y. LIEN LAW § 10(1).
122. See N.Y. LIEN LAW § 13(5).
123. For a definition of the term "bona fide purchaser" that favors the trustee as against
the New York mechanic's lienor, see Saghi v. Walsh (In re Gurs), 27 B.R. 163, 165 (Bankr.
9th Cir. 1983) (such a purchaser takes "by an instrument that adheres to all formal requisites
usually and regularly followed in the relevant jurisdiction"). Deeds of conveyance in New
York "usually and regularly" contain the trust fund covenant required by Lien Law section
13(5).
124. 11 U.S.C. § 546(b).
125. Cf In re Chesterfield Developers, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 689, 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(holding that the choice is not made by either the trustee or the lienor, but by the wording of
the N.Y. Lien Law).
126. RJS Constr. Corp. v. C.H. Stuart, Inc. (In re C.H. Stuart, Inc.), 17 B.R. 400
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1982).
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mechanic's lien five days after the debtor filed for bankruptcy. The
trustee sought, under section 545(2) of the Code, to avoid the statutory lien. The court noted the limitation placed on the trustee's
avoiding power by section 546(b) and determined that section 13(5)
of the New York Lien Law 127 was a "generally applicable law," as
that term is used in section 546(b) .' 8 Recall that under section
13(5) of the New York Lien Law, a bona fide purchaser would take
subject to a subsequently filed mechanic's lien, if the lien was filed
within eight months after the recording of the deed to the purchaser
and if the deed failed to contain a special trust fund covenant. 2 9 If,
however, the deed contained the covenant, the grantee would prevail.
The court in Stuart held for the lienor, without referring to the presence or absence of a trust fund covenant:
The date of "conveyance" [within Lien Law § 13(5)] to the hypothetical [bona fide purchaser] was March 6, 1981 [(the date of
filing of the petition in bankruptcy)] which was before the expiration of four months [(i.e., the then-applicable period for lien filing)] after the completion of the project. RSJ [(the lienor)] filed its
lien on March 11, 1981 which was within four months of the "conveyance." Therefore, the debtor-in-possession cannot avoid the lien
under § 545.130
Previously, in In re Chesterfield Developers, Inc.,' the court
construed the predecessor to section 545(2) of the Code,'8 2 pursuant
to which the trustee had attacked a postpetition lien in his status as
bona fide purchaser. The court correctly acknowledged that the lienor's position, as against a prior purchaser, ordinarily turned upon
the presence or absence of the trust fund covenant required by New
York Lien Law section 13(5).183 The debtor-in-possession argued
that a trustee (or one in the position of trustee) should be "considered to be any kind of bona fide purchaser that local law would
make superior to the statutory lienor,"' 3' and therefore prevail in the
127. See supra note 120.
128. In re C.H. Stuart, Inc., 17 B.R at 405.
129. See supra note 120.
130. In re C.H. Stuart, Inc., 17 B.R. at 405.
131. 285 F. Supp. 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (proceeding under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act).
132. Bankruptcy Act § 67(c)(1)(B), Pub L. No. 89-495, 80 Stat. 268 (1966), repealed
by Title IV of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(92 Stat.) 2549, 2682.
133. Chesterfield Developers, 285 F. Supp. at 691-92.
134. Id. at 691 (emphasis added).
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status of a hypothetical grantee of a deed of conveyance assumed to
contain the trust fund covenant.
The court noted that if the covenant was not contained in the
deed of conveyance, the lienor who timely filed should prevail.13 5 It
then stated:
But assuming, now, the presence of the covenant, has not the hypothetical bona fide purchaser recognized the superiority of the lien
to his purchase? It is true that [section] 13[(5)] also provides that
a grantee shall not be responsible for the grantor's compliance with
the trust fund covenant. However, where the grantor and the
grantee are one and the same or alter-egos of each other, it would
be highly inequitable to allow the fiction of the hypothetical bona
fide purchaser to be used to defeat liens such as the instant one.'" 6
Thus, the trustee (here, the debtor-in-possession) loses whether
his status is that of a grantee under a deed with or without a covenant because the hypothetical grantor and the hypothetical grantee
in such a deed are the same entity, namely the debtor-in37
possession.'
D.

The Automatic Stay

The automatic stay provision of the Code permits the postpetition perfection of a lien, but only to the extent that the trustee's
rights and powers under sections 544, 545 and 549 are subject to
such perfection under section 546(b). 38 In the preceding analysis, an
attempt was made to indicate the extent to which, under New York
law, the trustee's avoiding powers under sections 544 and 545 of the
Code ' 9 have been treated as being subject to a relation back of
135. See N.Y. LIEN LAW §§ 10(1), 13(5).
136. Chesterfield Developers, 285 F. Supp. at 691-92 (emphasis added).
137. Even if a present-day court, construing section 545(2) of the Code in a Chapter 11
case, were to accept this far-reaching basis for refusing to differentiate between the two types
of grantees under section 13(5) of the New York Lien Law, the differentiation problem would
still persist in a Chapter 7 case. This is because in the vast majority of Chapter II cases,
where the debtor-in-possession seeks to avoid a transfer, the transfer will be one that the
debtor himself has made. Under the view of the Chesterfield Court, it would be inequitable to
permit the debtor to avoid such a transfer. Cf In re C.H. Stuart, Inc., 17 B.R. 400 (refusing
to avoid a postpetition lien on the basis of the trustee's status as a bona fide purchaser under
section 545(2), without any reference to the section 13(5) trust fund covenant).
138. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3).
139. No cases were found which considered section 546(b) in the context of a trustee's
attack pursuant to section 549. A relation-back of a postpetition perfection (creation) of a
mechanic's lien pursuant to section 546(b), in order to counter a trustee attack under section
549, would require the same differentiation between types of lien creditors or purchasers that
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perfection under section 546(b). Notwithstanding the sections 544

and 545 cases considered above, which have held in favor of the lienor against the trustee, the predictability for the outcome of future
cases involving the stay is low because of the complexity of the "generally applicable law"-the New York Lien Law-that must be con-

strued in each case.
In In re Fiorillo & Co.,'4 0 the court held that the automatic
stay was no bar to the postpetition filing of a mechanic's lien. 4 Re-

lying on Chesterfield Developers, in which "[tjhe efficacy of § 13(5)
of the Mechanics' Lien Law was explored,"' 4 2 the court held that
section 13(5) provided "a relation-back procedure [that was] . . .
effective [pursuant to section 546(b)] against a debtor in possession

in its capacity as trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a).'

43

The trust

fund covenant required by Lien Law section 13(5) was not men-

tioned, nor was the effect of its presence or absence on the priority
dispute between lienor and bona fide purchaser. Presumably, for the
lienor to prevail, it was sufficient that its postpetition filing for
perfection was effective against "an entity," namely a hypothetical
grantee whose deed did not contain the required covenant.
The tendency of the courts, thus far, to favor the New York
mechanic's lienor against the trustee in bankruptcy probably reflects
a sense of what appears to be the former's tenuous status: the risk
that bankruptcy will intervene between the time work is commenced

and the time the notice of lien is filed. Without a relation-back of a
postpetition filing, the lienor's only recourse, albeit an impractical
one, is to file successive prepetition notices of lien as work progresses,
or upon each delivery of materials.1 44 Arguably, then, the lienor who
was suggested for cases involving section 544 or 545. See supra part V.A.-C.
140. 19 B.R. 21 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); cf. LoPriore v. Imperia Bros. Inc. (In re
LoPriore), 115 B.R. 462 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); Kraft v. Fisk Assocs. (In re Millerlee
Corp.), 70 B.R. 780, 783 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("Since the filing of a notice of pendency
only continues the original mechanic's lien, which itself relates back to the date the work was
completed (see N.Y. Lien Law §§ 17 & 13(5)), the filing cannot violate the automatic stay.");
Armstrong World Indus. v. James A. Phillips, Inc. (In re James A. Phillips, Inc.), 29 B.R.
391, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating in dictum, "[t]he suppliers' right to assert liens under state
law is not stayed by the debtor's chapter 11 petition. Rather, § 362(b)(3) and § 546(b) ...
permit such liens to 'relate back' to the time of the underlying debt's creation as provided by
New York Lien Law § 13(5).") (citing In re C.H. Stuart. Inc., 17 B.R. 400); Denoyelles Co.
v. Requa Elec. Supply Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 753 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
141.

In re Fiorillo & Co., 19 B.R. at 23.

142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Cf.Hildreth Granite Co. v. City of Watervliet, 146 N.Y.S. 449, 450 (App. Div.
1914) (rejecting the contention that the trustee's status as a lien creditor could be used to
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files postpetition is within the class of persons intended to be protected by section 546(b). 1 5
Assuming that the lienor can get past the "differentiation"
problem considered above, there is an argument that will support a
relation back of perfection even though the actual act of perfection
also constitutes the act of lien creation. In In re ParrMeadows Racing Ass'n, Inc.,'46 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
New York county's real property tax lien, created and perfected
postpetition, related back to the prepetition tax status date and was
therefore not violative of the automatic stay. 147 The court determined that, as of such prepetition date, the county had a sufficient
interest in the property to which the postpetition perfection could
relate back: "[a]ll assessment of property occurs as of [the tax status
date], ... and from that time forward, the county has a real and
identifiable interest in the property which cannot be erased or altered
by subsequent events.' 48 Section 546(b) itself does not use the term
"lien," but refers generally to "an interest in property.' 49 The court
in Parr Meadows considered the postpetition creation of the lien to
be merely part of "the taxation process and the perfection of the
county's [prepetition] interest in the property."' 5 0
Subsequent to Parr Meadows, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, in Makoroff v. City of Lockport,"5 ' had occasion to
construe and apply the New York law relating to real property tax
liens, and "decline[d] to adopt the view of [the Second]
[C]ircuit."' 52 The court held that the taxing entity did not acquire,
at the tax status date, any interest to which a tax lien, created and
avoid a post-adjudication mechanic's lien, and remarking that a contrary view "would require
a materialman, in order to protect his rights, to file a new lien immediately after each load of
materials furnished, lest the contractor might file a petition in bankruptcy and defeat his
rights").
145.

See supra part II.

146. Lincoln Say. Bank v. Suffolk County Treasurer (In re Parr Meadows Racing Ass'n,
Inc.), 880 F.2d 1540 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1058 (1990).
147. Id. at 1546-48.
148. Id. at 1548.
149. 11 U.S.C. § 546(b). The same is true of section 362(b)(3), which brings section
546(b) into play in reference to the automatic stay.
150. Parr Meadows, 880 F.2d at 1547.
151. 916 F.2d 890 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 983 (1991).
152. Id. at 895. In dissent, Judge Weis saw "a fiat disagreement [between the majority
opinion and Parr Meadows] on the interpretation of state law. Certainly in the event of doubt,
deference is due the Second Circuit's reading of local law." Id. at 897 (Weis, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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perfected postpetition, could relate back. 153 Even after the tax status
date, "the taxing entity still possessed no more than an expectation
that taxes will be collected with respect to a particular property . . . .[The taxing entity] acquires an 'interest in property' only
when it has performed the statutory acts necessary to give rise to a
perfectible lien."' 154 Thus, the postpetition tax lien violated the automatic stay.' 5 5
The Third Circuit's Makoroff decision notwithstanding, the
Parr Meadows analysis could clearly be extended to uphold a
mechanic's lien that was created and perfected postpetition, if there
could be found a prepetition "interest" to which such perfection
could relate back. In John P. Kane Co. v. Kinney,t "6 a non-bankruptcy case, the New York Court of Appeals held that an owner's
general assignment for the benefit of creditors was not effective
against a subsequently filed mechanic's lien. 57
The object and purpose of the mechanics' lien law was to protect a
person who, with the consent of the owner of real property, enhanced its value by furnishing materials or performing labor in its
improvement, by giving him an interest therein to the extent of the
value of such material or labor. The filing of the notice of lien is
the statutory method prescribed by which the party entitled thereto
perfects his inchoate right to that interest. That is the manner and
mode of procedure in which the right is asserted. A certain time
[(i.e., the time permitted by statute for filing a notice of lien)] is
allowed in which the lien may be asserted or lost. During that [prefiling] time there is a preferentialstatutory right, in the nature of
an unperfected equitable lien, in favor of the laborer, mechanic,
materialman or sub-contractor. And when a notice of lien is filed
that right is perfected.'5 8
If a mechanic's lienor indeed has such an inchoate right, preferential
statutory right or unperfected equitable lien prior to filing a notice of
lien, then arguably such interest is one to which a postpetition filing
for perfection could relate back. Such an outcome is doubtful, however, because later New York decisions, although not from the Court
of Appeals, have rejected the concept of an inchoate or equitable
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 896.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
66 N.E. 619 (N.Y. 1903).
Id.at 619.
Id.(emphasis added).
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mechanic's lien. 159
VI.

POSTPETITION CONTINUATION OF A LIEN

If a lien has been created and perfected prepetition, 160 may a
lienor, postpetition, take whatever steps are necessary and sufficient
under state law to continue the lien without violating the automatic
stay in the bankruptcy case of the owner of real property?616 If the
lienor is not permitted to do so, the prepetition lien will be lost
through lapse."'2 Moreover, if the lienor is permitted to take the necessary steps but fails to do so, the lien will also be lost through
lapse.16 3 Under the Bankruptcy Code, however, the tolling provisions
of section 108(c)(2) might operate to preserve the lien until the stay
is terminated. 6 "
A typical state statute might simply provide that a mechanic's
lien will be lost unless, within a stated period of time after lien creation or perfection, an action is commenced to foreclose the lien. For
example, Minnesota provides that "[n]o lien shall be enforced in any
case unless the holder thereof shall assert the same . . . within one
year after the date of the last item of the claim."' 6 5 However, although the commencement of such an action would effect a continuation of the lien, the action also constitutes enforcement of the lien
159. See Tisdale Lumber Co. v. Read Realty Co., 138 N.Y.S. 829, 831 (App. Div.
1912) ("There is no such thing as an 'inchoate' mechanic's lien. The sole right given by the
statute is to create a lien which has no existence, inchoate or otherwise, until the notice is
filed .... "); cf. McCorkle v. Herrman, 22 N.E. 948 (N.Y. 1889); Home Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Four Star Heights, Inc., 333 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Sup. Ct. 1971); Anderman v. 1395 E.
52nd St. Realty Corp., 303 N.Y.S.2d 474 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Billson Hous. Corp. v. Harrison,
205 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Sup. Ct. 1960); General Elec. Co. v. Mori, 201 N.Y.S. 561 (Sup. Ct.
1923).
160. The analysis that follows in the text should also apply to the case where perfection
is effected postpetition but relates back to a prepetition date pursuant to § 546(b).
161. Or in the bankruptcy of the contractor or subcontractor? See supra part III.
162. See, e.g., N.Y. LIEN LAW § 17 (1993) (mechanic's lien lapses at the end of one
year from the time of filing thereof unless continued by an action to foreclose, a recorded
extension, or a court order).
163. Cf. In re Willax, 93 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1937) (holding that although the court has
the power to enjoin the enforcement of liens, it has no power to recognize a lien which the
lienor has failed to continue in the ways prescribed by statute). A third possibility is that the
lienor will be permitted to continue the lien postpetition without violating the stay. If this were
the situation, there would be no problem.
164. 11 U.S.C. § 108(c)(2) (1988); see infra notes 174-84 and accompanying text.
165. MINN. STAT. § 514.12(3) (Supp. 1993); see Victoria Grain Co. of Minneapolis v.
James Elevator Constr., Inc. (In re Victoria Grain Co. of Minneapolis), 45 B.R. 2 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1984); see also, e.g.. ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 770, § 60/9 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (suit to
enforce a lien must be brought within two years after completion of performance).
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and as such, would violate the automatic stay.166 Nor is such an action ordinarily an aspect of perfection, 16 7 so as to come within the
second sentence of section 546(b), permitting a relation-back of such
perfection/enforcement if the requisite notice is given as a substitute
for the commencement of the action.
Some state statutes provide a specific durational period for the
lien, after which time the lien lapses unless either an action is commenced to enforce the lien or some alternative step is taken. Consider, for example, the Idaho statute:
No lien . . .binds any building, mining claim, improvement or
structure for a longer period than six (6) months after the claim
has been filed, unless proceedings be commenced in a proper court
within that time to enforce such lien; or unless a payment on account is made, or extension of credit given with expiration date
thereof . . .six (6) months after the date of such payment or expiration of extension.168
New York has a more complicated statute:
No lien . . .shall be a lien for a longer period than one year after
the notice of lien is filed, unless within that time an action is commenced to foreclose the lien . . . ; or unless an extension to such
lien, except for a lien on real property improved or to be improved
with a single family dwelling, is filed with the county clerk . . .
within one year from the filing of the original notice of lien ....
No lien shall be continued by such extension for more than one
year from the filing thereof. In the event an action is not commenced to foreclose the lien within such extended period, such lien
shall be extinguished unless . . .[a court] order be granted . . .
continuing such lien . . . .No lien shall be continued by court order for more than one year from the granting thereof, but a new
order .. .may be made in each successive year. 169
166. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) (staying any act to enforce any lien against property of the
estate). Enforcement issues are discussed infra part VII.
167. See, e.g., Meek Lumber Yard, Inc. v. Houts (In re Houts), 23 B.R. 705, 707
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982) ("The courts distinguish, and properly so, between the act of perfecting the lien and the act of attempting to enforce it."); First Am. Title Co. v. Design Builders,
Inc. (In re Design Builders, Inc.), 18 B.R. 392, 395 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1981)
("[C]ommencement of an action [under Idaho law] is not an element of 'perfection' [within
the meaning of the Code]."). But see Roofing Concepts, Inc. v. Kenyon Indus., Inc. (In re
Coated Sales, Inc.), 147 B.R. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding enforcement to be part of the
process of perfection under Rhode Island Law).
168. IDAHO CODE § 45-510 (1977 & Supp. 1993); see In re Design Builders, Inc., 18
B.R. at 394-95.
169. N.Y. LIEN LAW § 17 (McKinney 1993) (emphasis added). A lien on real property
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As indicated above, the commencement of an action to foreclose

a lien is an act to enforce the lien, 17 and as such, although also an
act to continue the lien, would violate the automatic stay.17 Arguably, however, other alternative acts taken to continue a lien, such as
a payment or extension of credit under the Idaho statute, or a recorded extension or court order under the New York statute, would

not violate the stay.
The automatic stay . . . operates only as a stay of "any act to
create, perfect or enforce" a lien against the property of the estate.
Significantly, the section does not explicitly prohibit acts to extend,
continue, or renew otherwise valid statutory liens, nor is there any
indication from
the legislative history that congress [sic] intended
17 2
such result.
If steps which do not violate the automatic stay, other than the

commencement of an action, may be taken to continue a lien, failure
to follow such procedure will result in a lapse of the lien. 1 73 However, the lienor may avoid having to take any steps if the commence-

ment of an action, as an alternative means of continuing the lien,
falls within section 108(c):
improved or to be improved with a single family dwelling may not be continued by a recorded
extension, but may be continued by either a court order or an action to foreclose. Id. A lien
may also be continued, irrespective of the type of property involved, if the lienor is made a
party-defendant in another lienor's action to foreclose a lien. Id.
170. Unless the commencement of an action is deemed to be part of the process of
perfection, the lienor cannot avoid the stay through the application of sections 362(b)(3) and
546(b).
171. It U.S.C. § 362(a)(4). However, as such act is the "commencing [of] . . . a civil
action," within section 108(c), the period for commencing such action is tolled, thus effectively
continuing the lien. See infra part VII.
172. Morton v. National Bank of New York City (In re Morton), 866 F.2d 561, 564 (2d
Cir. 1989) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). This case involved a prepetition judgment lien
that was extended by a postpetition court order. The court held that the order did not violate
the automatic stay. Cf. In re Stuber, 142 B.R. 435 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1992) (notice of federal
tax lien, filed postpetition to extend prepetition federal tax lien covered by earlier filed notice
of lien, did not violate the automatic stay).
Under New York law, a mechanic's lien may be lost if a copy of the filed notice of lien is
not served upon specific persons within specified periods of time. See N.Y. LIEN LAW §§ 11,
11-b (McKinney 1993). Presumably, such service could be effected postpetition without violating the automatic stay. LoPriore v. Imperia Bros. Inc. (In re LoPriore), 115 B.R. 462 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1990); cf. Denoyelles Co. v. Requa Elec. Supply Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 753 (Sup. Ct.
1992) (recognizing that the automatic stay does not preclude serving a notice of lien; but the
court discharged a filed mechanic's lien for failure to effect service pursuant to Lien Law
§ I l-b).
173. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 45-510; N.Y. LIEN LAW § 17; supra notes 168-69 and
accompanying text.
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if applicable nonbankruptcy law . . . fixes a period for commencing or continuing a civil action in a court other than a bankruptcy
court on a claim against the debtor . . . and such period has not

expired before the date of the filing of the petition, then such period does not expire until the later of (1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such
period occurring on or after the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case; or
(2) 30 days after notice of the termination
or expiration of
174
the stay . . . with respect to such claim.

The case of In re Morton,17 5 which involved the continuation of
a judgment lien, might be instructive on the approach that a court
might take regarding a mechanic's lien under section 108(c). In
Morton, a creditor of the debtor had obtained and docketed a money
judgment on December 10, 1975, thereby obtaining a lien on the
debtor's real property.1"6 Under New York law, a judgment lien expires after ten years, 7 unless prior to that time the lienor obtains a
court order of extension.' 7 8 The debtor filed a petition under Chapter
13 of the Bankruptcy Code in October, 1982. In late 1985, at or
near the time the original ten-year period of the lien was to expire,
the creditor filed for an extension.17 9 The court issued an order of
extension in February, 1986.180 Analyzing the statutes and the prior
cases on the assumption that it was dealing with a statutory lien, the
court held that a postpetition extension of the prepetition-perfected
lien'would not violate the automatic stay."8 Thus, not only was the
creditor free to apply for a CPLR 5203(b) extension 82 notwithstanding the stay, but failure to do so would have resulted in the loss
of the lien through lapse.
The court went on, however, to hold that section 108(c) of the
174. 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) (emphasis added). Compare II U.S.C. § 108(a) (providing
the period of time within which the trustee may commence an action that the debtor could
have brought).
175. In re Morton, 866 F.2d 561.
176. Id. at 562.
177. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 5203(a) (McKinney 1978).
178. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 5203(b) (the extension is only for the period of time
that the creditor might have been stayed from enforcing his judgment or for the time necessary to complete a sale pursuant to an execution delivered to the sheriff prior to the expiration
of the original 10-year period).
179. In re Morton, 866 F.2d at 562.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 565.
182. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 5203(b).
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Code operated to toll the ten-year period of the lien until the automatic stay was lifted, so the creditor's application for an otherwise
required extension became unnecessary. The court's rationale for fitting the lien extension of CPLR 5203(b) into section 108(c) was as
follows:
[CPLR 5203(b)] "fixes a period" of ten years wherein a judgment
creditor with a lien on real property may execute on its judgment
and retain its priority to proceeds therefrom. Such an execution is
supplemental to the original action that gave rise to the judgment . . . and is thus part of a "continuing" action against the
debtor. 83
In retrospect, In re Morton probably offers little benefit to a
New York mechanic's lienor in regard to postpetition continuation of
the lien by any of the three methods provided by Lien Law section
17. First, the method of continuation by the commencement of an
action to foreclose, which is a form of lien enforcement, is precluded
as violative of the automatic stay. However, the period for commencing such an action is tolled by section 108(c) as a "commencing,"
not a "continuing," and so is not subject to the Morton analysis.
Second, the stay would not be violated if the lienor recorded an extension or, third, obtained a court order under New York Lien Law
section 17. Ostensibly, then, one or the other of such methods would
have to be used in order to prevent the lapse of the lien. Section
108(c) would not excuse resort to either of the two methods: under
no stretch of the analysis of Morton could either method be deemed
as "continuing a civil action." Nonetheless, if section 108(c) operates
to toll the continuation or enforcement period of the first method
(the commencement of an action to foreclose) the lienor need not
apply either of the other two methods; the lien is automatically continued for the tolling period, whether or not an extension is filed or a
court order is obtained postpetition. It is possible, however, that a
court might take a contrary view and require that the lien be continued by recording an extension or by court order, in order for the
lienor to take advantage of the expanded period for enforcement. In
the special case where a foreclosure action had been commenced
prepetition, the Morton analysis might work to the lienor's benefit by
tolling any period required for the performance of an act which
would be considered as "continuing a civil action,"-that is, continu183.

In re Morton, 866 F.2d at 567.
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ing the foreclosure action.1 84
VII.

POSTPETITION ENFORCEMENT OF A LIEN

Generally, the commencement of an action to foreclose a lien
constitutes an act to enforce a lien within section 362(a)(4), and not
an act to perfect it. l8 5 Thus, there is no basis for a relation-back
argument to avoid the stay under sections 362(b)(3) or 546(b). 186
184. For example, a lienor might be required to extend the lifetime of a notice of pendency filed in connection with the action to enforce a lien. See N.Y. LIEN LAW § 17 (terminating a lien if the notice of pendency ceases to be effective as constructive notice; but such
notice may be extended pursuant.to N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 6513 (McKinney 1980)). This
assumes that the lienor does not wish, or cannot obtain a modification of the stay applicable to
such enforcement acts. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)-(g).
185. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4); see Miner Corp. v. Hunters Run Ltd. Partnership (In re
Hunters Run Ltd. Partnership), 875 F.2d 1425, 1428-29 (9th Cir. 1989); H.T. Bowling, Inc. v.
Bain (In re Bain), 64 B.R. 581, 583 (W.D. Va. 1986); Victoria Grain Co. of Minneapolis v.
Janesville Elevator Constr. Co. (In re Victoria Grain Co. of Minneapolis), 45 B.R. 2, 6
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1984); First Am. Textile Co. v. Design Builders, Inc. (In re Design Builders,
Inc.), 18 B.R. 392, 394-95 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1981).
For some courts, statutes which specify a certain period of time within which a lienor
must commence an action to enforce a lien are characterized as statutes of "duration," and not
true statutes of "limitation." An action within the scope of the former constitutes part of the
lien perfection process; thus, the notice described by the second sentence of section 547(b) of
the Code, as a substitute for such action, may be used to effect a relation back of a postpetition perfection to avoid the automatic stay. There is no tolling by section 108(c). See, e.g., In
re Birdview Satellite Communications, Inc., 90 B.R. 465 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1988). The contrary
view is that the commencement of an action is pure enforcement and not part of perfection,
and that section 108(c) applies irrespective of the characterization of the statute as durational
or limitational.
186. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text. Under prior bankruptcy law, there
was no stay provision, but a court could enjoin the postpetition enforcement of a prepetition
lien. See Brower v. Schlott (In re. Weston), 68 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1934); cf. In re Willax, 93
F.2d 293, 295 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that "an adjudication in bankruptcy does not prevent a
claimant from perfecting a lien as distinguished from enforcing it"). Under current bankruptcy law, however, the automatic stay operates against the postpetition enforcement of a
mechanic's lien whether the real property is owned by the debtor, see, e.g., Meek Lumber
Yard, Inc. v. Houts (In re Houts), 23 B.R. 705, 706 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982); In re Fiorillo &
Co., 19 B.R. 21, 23 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); cf. Diamond Hill Inv. Co. v. Shelden, 767 P.2d
1005 (Wyo. 1989) (stay operated against lienor to prohibit the postpetition amending of prepetition foreclosure complaint to include certain mortgagees as defendants), or a contractor or
subcontractor against whom the lienor has a claim. See supra part III; see also Garbe Iron
Works, Inc. v. Priester, 457 N.E.2d 422, 424 (Il1. 1983); cf Valley Transit Mix of Ruidoso,
Inc. v. Miller, 928 F.2d 354, 356 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding the stay applicable to enforcement
of a lien against owner-lessor's property in bankruptcy of lessee). It is immaterial whether or
not the lienor who commences a foreclosure action has knowledge of the stay. See In re Victoria Grain Co. of Minneapolis, 45 B.R. at 6. But cf. Roofing Concepts, Inc. v. Kenyon Indus.,
Inc. (In re Coated Sales, Inc.), 147 B.R. 842, 847 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (voicing disapproval with the lienor's violation of the stay, but failing to impose any penalty beyond that
imposed by the Code of nullifying the conduct, because of the plaintiff's uncontested lack of
knowledge about the bankruptcy).
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Nevertheless, because of the tolling provision of section 108(c), a lienor might be able to both avoid violating the stay and avoid a lapse
of the lien.' 87
Almost "any act to . . . enforce any lien against property of
the estate"' 88 would be part of the process of commencing or continuing a civil action, within the meaning of section 108(c) of the Code,
and therefore be subject to the automatic stay. However, although
the stay would operate against such an action, the time period under
"applicable nonbankruptcy law"' 89 for performing such act would be
extended to the later of "(1) the end of [the applicable time] period,
including any suspension of such period occurring on or after the
commencement of the case; or (2) 30 days after notice of the termination or expiration of the stay."' 9 But, the courts disagree about
the meaning of the term "suspension" in section 108(c).
For instance, in Garbe Iron Works, Inc. v. Priester,'9 ' a subcontractor completed work on February 2, 1979 and filed a claim for a
lien on May 2, 1979.192 The Illinois statute required that a suit to
enforce a lien be brought within two years after the completion of
performance. 19 a Thus, the two-year period would have expired on
February 2, 1981.11" On August 11, 1980, within the statute of limitations period, the debtor filed a petition in bankruptcy. Subsequently, on December 23, 1980, 133 days after the petition was filed,
the lienor obtained a court order permitting it to proceed against the
debtor'95-in effect, a lifting of the stay. 98 The lienor filed suit on
March 16, 1981, after the expiration of the two-year limitations period, and the defendants moved to dismiss because the plaintiff had
187. Technically speaking, the lienor is not free to disregard the stay and go about his or
her business. Instead, the stay remains in full force; the time period for enforcement is merely
extended. See supra part VI; infra notes 188-203 and accompanying text.
188. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4).
189. 11 U.S.C. § 108(c).
190. Id. (emphasis added); see APC Constr.-I, 112 B.R. 89, 117-20 (Bankr. D. Vt.
1990), affd sub norn. APC Constr.-II, 132 B.R. 690 (D. Vt. 1991). Of course, section 108(c)
would have no application where the state limitations period had expired prepetition. Burger v.
Level End Dairy Investors (In re Burger), 125 B.R. 894 (Bankr. D. Del. 1991).
191. 457 N.E.2d 422 (Ill. 1983).
192. Id. at 424. The contractor, not the owner, was the debtor in bankruptcy; however,
as the contractor was a necessary party in a suit by the subcontractor to enforce its lien
against the owner's property, the stay precluded such suit. See supra part Ill.
193. Garbe Iron Works, 457 N.E.2d at 424.

194.

Id.

195.
196.

Id.
See II U.S.C. § 362(d)-(g).
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failed to file suit within the applicable limitations period. 197
The court, however, held that the plaintiff's filing was timely:
the plaintiff was precluded from suit for the 133 days between the
date of bankruptcy and the lifting of the stay and thus, the plaintiff
should be given that same period after the expiration of the two-year
limitation period to commence a suit. 198 In effect, the court construed the "suspension" language of section 108(c) to include the
period during which the lienor was precluded by the bankruptcy itself from bringing suit. The court rejected the defendants' contention
that such language applied only to particular nonbankruptcy statutory schemes providing for suspension and concluded that
[w]hile not entirely free from doubt, the intent . . . seems to be to

extend the period within which a creditor may act by the greater of
(1) the period granted by a particular statutory scheme, (2) the
period during which action has been stayed by the Bankruptcy Act,
or (3) 30 days after notice of the termination of the stay. 99
The cases holding to the contrary would limit the "suspension"
language in section 108(c) to nonbankruptcy tolling periods, such as
those for minority or incompetency,"' or those specialized federal
suspension statutes, such as the Internal Revenue Code.2"' In Grotting v. Hudson Shipbuilders, Inc.,2"' for example, the court rejected
the plaintiff's contention that the unexpired portion of the statute of
limitations period as of the time the stay took effect, should have
been added on to that limitations period, and therefore that a suit
197. Garbe Iron Works, 457 N.E.2d at 424. On January 9, 1981, plaintiff received notice of the order lifting the stay, so paragraph (1), not paragraph (2), of section 108(c) of the
Code provided the "later" outside date for filing suit. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 425 (emphasis added). It is not clear from this language whether the 133
days is to be computed from the date the stay was lifted or from the date of expiration of the
two year limitations period; however, the particular date chosen would not affect the outcome
in this case. The Garbe Iron Works approach was followed in Major Lumber v. G. & B.
Remodeling, Inc., 817 S.W.2d 474 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991). In Major Lumber, the operative
dates, all in 1989, were as follows: (1) lien filing on May 10; (2) bankruptcy filing on May 11;
(3) automatic stay lifted on September 25; (4) 30-day period of section 108(c)(2) expired on
October 25; (5) Missouri six month statute of limitations expired on November 10; and (6)
lienor's action to enforce his lien was filed on November 15. Id. at 475. The court held that the
action was timely, adding the period of the operation of the stay onto the original statute of
limitations. Id. at 424-25.
200. See Grotting v. Hudson Shipbuilders, Inc., 85 B.R. 568, 569 (W.D. Wash. 1988)
(personal injury action).
201. Wilkey v. Union Bank & Trust Co. (In Re Baird), 63 B.R. 60, 63 (Bankr. D. Ky.
1986).
202. 85 B.R. 568 (W.D. Wash. 1988).

19931

MECHANICS' LIENS IN THE FACE OF A STAY

filed within such extended period should be deemed timely.20 3
VIII.

CONCLUSION

A mechanic's lienor has to be wary of the possibility of the
bankruptcy of an owner of real property improved by the rendition
of services or the furnishing of materials, as well as the bankruptcy
of a contractor or subcontractor against whom such lienor has a
claim, where such claim is not against the owner directly. Not only
might certain acts taken by the lienor to create, perfect, continue, or
enforce his lien be subject to avoidance by the trustee exercising his
formidable powers under sections 544, 545 and 549 of the Bankruptcy Code, but such acts might violate the automatic stay of section 362 of the Code.
A mechanic's lien that is created and perfected prepetition will
survive bankruptcy, although the underlying claim against the
debtor will be discharged. The lienor will be precluded by the automatic stay from enforcing his lien postpetition and during bankruptcy, but any statute of limitations relating to such enforcement
may be tolled to enable the lienor to enforce the lien once the stay is
terminated. If the lienor has acquired the lien prepetition, a postpetition perfection might relate back to a prepetition date, thereby
avoiding the stay. Whether the lien is originally perfected prepetition
or postpetition, the continuation of such perfection should be permissible and not violative of the automatic stay, at least where the particular act of continuation does not also involve enforcement.

203. Id. The sequence of events in Grotting was as follows: (1) the plaintiff suffered
personal injuries, which gave rise to his cause of action; (2) defendant filed a Chapter 11
petition on February 9, 1983; (3) because this was a maritime tort, the three-year statute of
limitations under 46 U.S.C. app. § 763a (1988) expired on November 29, 1984 (unless tolled
or suspended by section 108(c)); (4) on plaintiff's motion, the automatic stay was lifted on
June 30, 1986; (5) plaintiff filed suit for damages on September 4, 1986. Id. at 569.
When the statute of limitations was asserted as a defense, the plaintiff argued that the
portion of the original limitations period which was left at the time the stay took effect-one
year and 294 days-should have been added onto the limitations period to determine a new
limitations period available to the plaintiff once the stay was lifted. Id. Roughly computed, the
new period would have extended to September 20, 1986, and the plaintiffs action, commenced
on September 4, 1986, would have been timely. Id. at 568-70. The court rejected the argument, however, holding that because the original statute of limitations had expired at the time
the stay was lifted, the plaintiff had only 30 days from such time-until July 30, 1986-to file
suit. Id. at 569. The court viewed section 108(c) to "merely provide[ I an extra 30 days to file
a claim if the claims' limitation period expired before the automatic stay was lifted." Id. at
569-70.

